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1CHAPTER 1. Introduction
Service oriented architecture (SOA) is an architectural paradigm to promote reuse of sys-
tems and integration of subsystems to build new applications. The subsystems which are
exposed as services can be composed or orchestrated to create new systems.
Though SOA promotes abstraction, loose coupling and interoperability, there are certain
pitfalls with regards to security and trust. Web based services have the property of location
transparency, i.e. client does not care about where the services are located. This gives rise to
the need to verify the trustworthiness of a remotely hosted computation. It is important to see
to it that the terms and conditions agreed to before a transaction carried out by the remotely
hosted computation are not violated during or after the transaction. Among other things, this
kind of verification is essential for regulatory compliance in the payment card industry; where
sensitive customer data is increasingly at risk of being stolen or being used for adversarial
purposes and there is a pressing need to protect the privacy and integrity of such data.
Specifying and verifying functional and non-functional requirements for service-oriented
architectures had not received much attention until recently. Kuo et al. have discussed an
approach for expressing and reasoning about functional requirements for service-oriented com-
puting [25]. The focus of their approach is on facilitating a more concise representation of the
message exchange protocols as a Boolean formula associated with each exchanged message,
which in turn helps to verify whether a given message exchange is legal. On the other end
of the spectrum are approaches to dynamically monitor web service compositions such as by
Baresi et al. [8], Barbon et al. [7] and Mahbub and Spanoudakis [27]. Such approaches verify
the service compositions for their syntactic and semantic accuracy.
The advantage of these approaches is that they are independent of the web service imple-
2mentation. A significant disadvantage and the problem that this thesis addresses is that they
do not allow verification of non-functional requirements such as integrity of the web services,
information flow properties, etc. To verify such properties, a trustworthy verifier need to be
deployed on the service provider’s environment. I argue in this thesis that it is difficult to
realize such a verifier using a software-only approach1.
To overcome the above shortcomings, the key insight behind my thesis is to employ a
hardware-based trust mechanism called Trusted Platform Module to bootstrap trust in a
service-oriented architecture. Trusted Platform Module is based on the specifications pro-
vided by the Trusted Computing Group’s initiative [2]. A related idea proposed by Sailer et
al. also uses similar insights to measure the integrity of remote platforms [39]. This thesis
advances upon the idea by proposing an architecture that serves to monitor remotely hosted
web services and give an assurance about their integrity.
Implementing an architecture to conduct attestation of remotely deployed web services
involved achieving secure interaction between three entities - the service oriented architecture,
the TPM hardware and the requirements monitor. Since the root of trust in this architecture
is derived from the TPM hardware, every proof of verification of the web service execution
had to include the integrity measurement of the environment as reported by the TPM in the
service provider’s environment. Such a trustworthy measurement serves as the basis for giving
an assurance to the client regarding the integrity of the web service.
We validated the implementation of the architecture by tracking the use of sensitive data
in a web service execution by using the requirements monitor. Whenever there was a violation,
it was detected by the system. If there was no violation, the system is capable of giving an
assurance about the transaction to the client.
This work demonstrates the feasibility of implementing an architecture that establishes
trust in service oriented architecture. The implementation has been successfully tested on
standard web services available with the Apache Axis distribution. Using this architecture,
it is possible to give an assurance or detect a requirement-violation for every execution of a
1These ideas were first proposed and discussed in our publications [19, 20]. This thesis is a consolidation of
these previous works.
3remotely deployed web service. The results show that it is feasible to effectively monitor web
services in a service oriented architecture for non-functional requirements such as privacy and
integrity with a short time-overhead.
1.1 Thesis Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 1: The primary driver for Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) implementation
is change. SOA essentially consists of services which are units of individual functionalities
designed according to certain functional specifications or requirements. These services are
deployed on remote servers and it is a challenge to monitor such services for non-functional
requirements such as security, integrity and data confidentiality. This chapter presents a brief
overview of the research carried out in the direction of monitoring such non-functional require-
ments.
Chapter 2: An introduction to Service Oriented Architecture and its applications are
presented. This chapter also covers the component architecture of Trusted Platform Module
and its usage models.
Chapter 3: Existing architectures and security paradigms, along with the comparison
to the proposed architecture are discussed in this chapter. The chronology of development
of these architectures, models and paradigms is traced. The ideas are classified into various
categories based on similarities of concepts and platform-architectures.
Chapter 4: The motivation for monitoring non-functional requirements in web services is
discussed. This chapter also elaborates the problem we address and the goal of this research.
This is followed by the hypothesis of building a layer of trust into Service Oriented Architecture
based on the Clark-Wilson model.
Chapter 5: Our approach towards guaranteeing trust in SOA involves the use of Trusted
Platform Modules (TPMs) to accurately monitor and report the status of the Requirement
Monitoring software, which in turn oversees the secure execution of the web service. The
proposed SOA architecture includes an additional interface called the trust negotiation and
4verification interface which establishes trust between the communicating parties in a SOA.
Trust negotiation happens once and the reposed trust can be verified by the client for every
transaction through the trusted third party. This chapter describes the proposed system
architecture, components within the proposed architecture and its implementation in detail.
Chapter 6: This chapter demonstrates the feasibility of implementing the proposed ar-
chitecture in the context of a Service Oriented Architecture using a Trusted Platform Module.
The proposed architecture is used to evaluate web services available with the standard Apache
Axis distribution. The results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed architecture to
verify the integrity of web services in spite of incurring a short time-overhead.
Chapter 7: In this chapter, a representative web service - Shopping Cart is selected as a
candidate for explaining the detailed evaluation procedure that was adopted to evaluate every
web service of the Apache Axis distribution. A comparison of the execution traces of the
genuine and compromised web service is also shown.
Chapter 8: The conclusion of the thesis is presented here. Some of the security issues with
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) and how the proposed architecture can be used to address
important problems like that of monitoring of non-functional requirements are discussed. A
discussion on the future directions of research involving the use of program analysis techniques
and virtual-machine based monitoring to improve the efficiency of the proposed architecture
is also included.
5CHAPTER 2. Background
A breif discussion on Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) and Trusted Platform Modules
(TPM) is presented in this chapter.
2.1 Service Oriented Architecture
Service Oriented Architecture consists of services. A service is a well-defined and a self-
contained function that does not depend on the context or state of other services. Every service
has a published interface, often in the form of a WSDL (Web Services Definition Language)
file [12]. A service oriented architecture is a collection of such services. A service oriented
architecture essentially defines three type of entities: service implementation (or providers),
service mediation (or brokers), and service consumption (or clients) [15, 30, 31].
Figure 2.1 illustrates the find-bind-execute paradigm used in SOA. In this paradigm, service
providers register their services in a public registry called a service broker. The clients use this
broker to find services that match their criteria. The broker provides a contract between the
client and the service provider. The services may communicate with each other either by
exchanging data or they may coordinate with each other to perform some complex operation.
In a SOA, the resources in a networked environment are all exposed as services that can
be made use of by a client on the network through their published interfaces without the
knowledge of their implementation details. The aim of this work is to guarantee the integrity
of such implementations of web services.
Service oriented architectures (or service oriented computing paradigm) promote abstrac-
tion, loose coupling and interoperability of clients and services [31]. The key idea is to introduce
a published interface (often in the form of a description written in web services definition lan-
6Figure 2.1 SOA Paradigm
guage, WSDL [12]), which acts as a basis for communication between three types of entities:
service implementation (or providers), service mediation (or brokers), and service consump-
tion (or clients), that often follows the sequence publish-find-bind-execute to discover and use
services [31]. The published interface describes the functional requirements for co-ordination
between service implementations and clients. Every service implementation must satisfy its
functional requirements. For example, a published interface for a location-based hotel finding
service may expect clients to provide GPS co-ordinates in a specified format and expect the
service implementation to produce the address of the nearest hotel as a string to those GPS
co-ordinates. The specification of input (GPS co-ordinates) and output (string containing the
hotel’s address) describe the functional requirements for this service.
2.1.1 Clark-Wilson Integrity Model
To guarantee integrity of web service implementations, we use Clark-Wilson Model [13] in
SOA. Clark Wilson integrity model is a foundation for specifying and analyzing integrity of
any computing system. Clark-Wilson integrity model formalizes the concept of information
integrity. Clark-Wilson model particularly emphasizes that the implementer of the transaction
and the certifier of the transaction are essentially different entities. According to the model,
7any well-formed transaction should transition a system from one consistent state to another
consistent state. To monitor this, there has to be a mechanism that transparently reports the
state of the service provider’s system from time to time. Such a mechanism should not be
vulnerable to any kind of tampering.
2.2 Trusted Platform Modules
Over the past few years, the computer industry has come up with many initiatives to
guarantee security, integrity and confidentiality of data through innovative hardware-based
architectures. A consortium of key industry players, Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [42],
came up with the specifications for a TPM with such a goal. The TCG vision was that
this rudimentary TPM supported trust can be bootstrapped into a higher level trust through
some software trust architecture or design principle. Another popular initiative is the Next-
Generation Secure Trusted Computing Base (NGSCB) [29]. Hardware vendors are moving
towards installing TPM on every computer that ships.
A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a trusted agent co-processor within a remote com-
puting platform which derives its root of trust from its manufacturer or a delegated trusted
third party [42]. A TPM can be trusted to perform certain actions truthfully despite being
an integral part of a potentially malicious or compromised system. In other words, it is our
trusted ambassador in a friendly or hostile foreign territory. The TPM hardware, firmware and
the software provides a platform root of trust. A TPM can extend its trust to higher layers of
the system by building a chain of trust starting from the hardware and subsequently linking
one layer to the next.
Figure 2.2 lists the components that constitute a TPM [2]. The I/O component manages
the information flow over the communication bus.
2.2.1 Cryptographic Coprocessor
The cryptographic coprocessor of TPM implements cryptographic functions which are ex-
ecuted within the TPM hardware. Hardware or software entities outside the TPM have no
8Figure 2.2 TPM Component Architecture
access to the execution of these functions. A TPM also contains a RSA accelerator to perform
2048 bit RSA encryption and decryption. The TPM uses RSA algorithm for signature oper-
ations on internal and external items. There is also an engine for computing SHA1 hash for
small pieces of data within the TPM. This SHA1 interface is exposed to the software entities
outside the TPM to support taking of measurements during the platform boot phases.
A Random Number Generator (RNG) is the source of randomness in TPM. It provided
for generating keys for key generation, generation of nonces and for randomness in signatures.
This randomness capability is protected from external access. A TPM manages its power state
as well as the power state of the platform through the Power Detection component. The Opt-
in component allows the TPM to be turned on/of or activated/deactivated. The Execution
Engine executes the commands received from the I/O component of the TPM.
2.2.2 Cryptographic Keys
Every TPM is identified by a built-in key called the Endorsement Key, which is included
in it by the manufacturer . The key size is 2048 bits. The trust that one reposes in a TPM
comes from the fact that this key is unique and is protected at all times in the TPM. An
Endorsement Certificate, which contains the public key of the Endorsement Key, certifies this
9property. This key can be used by the owner to anonymously confirm that the identity keys
were generated by the TPM in his system. In essence, every computer has a unique identity
which cannot be repudiated. This can serve to be a fool-proof identity for every user. The
TPM manufacturer provides a certificate for the Endorsement Key.
There is another kind of keys related to Endorsement Key called the Attestation Identity
Keys (AIK). These keys are used by a privacy CA to present different AIKs to different remote
parties to enable the system to hide its platform identity from other systems.
The TPM can be used to store three kinds of certificates [6].
• Endorsement Certificate: Attests that a particular platform configuration is genuine.
This contains the public part of Endorsement Key.
• Platform Certificate: Attests that the security components of the platform are gen-
uine. This is provided by the platform vendor.
• Conformance Certificate: This can be provided by a third party to certify the security
properties of the platform.
2.2.3 TPM Registers
The TPM also has a set of registers called Platform Configuration Registers(PCR) which
can be used to store the 160-bit hash values obtained using the SHA1 hashing algorithm of
the TPM. The hardware ensures that the hash value of any PCR can be changed only by
encrypting the new data over the previous hash value of the PCR. In this way, PCRs can
be used to indelibly record the history of the machine since the last reboot. The PCRs are
cleared off at the time of system reboot. PCR values are used to decide whether a system can
be trusted.
2.3 TPM Usage Models
Bajikar [6] describes the application of TPM in protecting confidential data and certifying
credentials of the platform. Accordingly, three important usage models of the TPM have been
10
described.
• Hardware Protected Storage: The TPM can be employed to protect sensitive data
of the user by encrypting the secret data in such a way that it can only be decoded on a
specific hardware that contains the necessary private key.
• Information Binding: Certain critical data can be bound to a particular platform in
such a way that it is accessible only if the conditions specified during the binding are
met. Data will be rendered inaccessible if it is migrated to a different platform.
• Platform Authentication: Attestation Identity Keys are always bound to the plat-
form. These can be used to authenticate the user and the platform.
Critics of TPM claim that TPMs will have a huge impact on user privacy. Service providers
with commercial interest will try to misuse the power of TPM by introducing stricter controls
and by eliminating user-anonymity. Anderson et al. present a detailed discussion on the recent
controversies and the benefits of trusted computing in [3]. Sadeghi et. al. have proposed a
hybrid kernel architecture called PERSEUS [33], to reduce the scope of the strict controls of the
TPM and to restrict the controls to wherever its necessary and applicable. In this architecture,
the client operating system provides the user with a common user interface which is backward
compatible, to reuse all uncritical standard applications and services such as file system and
network operations. In [37] they extend the PERSEUS kernel architecture to support TCPA
(Trusted Computing Platform Alliance) and Microsoft Palladium.
11
CHAPTER 3. Related Work
In this section we trace the chronology of a variety of techniques and paradigms that were
developed to protect sensitive data and, to secure virtual machines and operating systems.
3.1 Secure o/s and cryptography techniques
Ever since the 1970s, efforts have been made to produce secure operating systems [40] as
a basis for secure computing. Any system can be thought of as consisting of many layers of
abstractions. The integrity of a system is built recursively through a chain of integrity checks
starting from the lowermost level of abstraction. Each level is checked for integrity before
passing the control to the next higher level. In 1997, Arabaugh et al. proposed an architecture
for secure and reliable bootstrapping called AEGIS [5]. In AEGIS, the integrity checks begin
from the power-on and continue till the control is handed over to the operating system. AEGIS
modifies the boot process so that all executable code is verified using digital signatures prior
to its execution. Here, the chain of trust begins from the software loaded in BIOS and PROM
boards. AEGIS guarantee that the system initializes to a secure state.
Another aspect related to security of the sensitive data is verifying untrustworthy applica-
tions before executing them locally. This involves establishing trust between the code producer
and the host. Cryptography [9] can be used to ensure that the code was produced by a trusted
source. Occasionally, even trusted sources may act maliciously because of human errors. Since
this system relies on a personal authority to be impeccable, it is not very strong. In 1997,
Necula [28] introduced the concept of proof-carrying code. This is a mechanism by which the
host system can determine if an untrustworthy application is safe to be executed within its
environment. This process consists of a security policy which is defined by the code consumer.
12
The safety policy has a set of safety rules and the interface. The safety rules record a list of
authorized operations and their safety preconditions. The interface describes the invariants
that hold during and after invoking functions provided by the untrustworthy code. The code
is certified by the producer and is validated by the code consumer. The code validation is
done only once irrespective of the number of executions, using an algorithm which the host
trusts. The major advantages of this approach are that it requires lesser time and little user
interaction.
Microsoft has incorporated a feature called Secure Startup starting withWindows Vista [29].
Secure Startup has the capability to ensure that the PC running Vista starts in a known good-
state. AEGIS cannot distinguish fake hardware from the genuine one. If the booting process
is not sequential, certain non-trivial changes have to be made to the architecture.
3.2 Monitoring virtual machines and information flows
In 2003, Grafinkel et al. proposed Terra, a virtual-machine based platform for trusted
computing. In Terra, a virtual machine monitor was used to simultaneously partition the
hardware into independent, isolated virtual machines. The software stack of each virtual
machine could be tailored to meet the security requirements of the software running on that
virtual machine. However, it is not possible to selectively measure individual software. The
ever increasing number of device drivers pose a formidable challenge to implement the virtual
machine monitor. Terra does not address the issue of loading untrustworthy drivers. Unlike
AEGIS, Terra does not start from a secure boot process.
There are many ways and means to enforce policies such as confidentiality and security
on the end-to-end behavior of a computing system. Such methods are broadly classified as
Information Flow Mechanisms. Other than carrying out a rigorous analysis on the system as
a whole to prove that it enforces the specified security policies, Information Flow Mechanisms
also take into consideration the possibility of supplying malicious inputs to the program so
that it terminates abnormally. It is then verified if confidential information can be extracted
from the exception trace.
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Sablefeld et al. address such issues through language-based techniques for specification and
enforcement of security policies in [36]. The limitation of this approach is that the security
policies can only be specified by the programmer. The user of the software has no say in it.
Identifying such short-comings, Vachharajani et al. proposed RIFLE [44], a user-centric run-
time information flow architecture. Information flow systems such as this allow untrustworthy
applications to access confidential data but prevents the data from getting leaked to other
programs or covert channels. The authors claim that RIFLE can be used to enforce user-defined
security policies on any program through a security-enhanced operating system. The program
binary is translated from the conventional Instruction-Set Architecture (ISA) to an Information
Flow Secure (IFS) architecture. This translated program is executed on a hardware designed
for information-flow tracking. The goal is to verify if the program contains only legal flows,
which is defined by the user in the security policy. Such an architecture is very useful if the
user wants to be certain that the program running on his/her machine is not propagating
any confidential local data, that the user is unaware of. It is difficult to apply this technique
without major changes in the context of a service oriented architecture because the web service
implementation program runs elsewhere rather than locally.
3.3 TCG based integrity measurement
In 2004, Sailer et al. proposed a TCG based Integrity Measurement Architecture for
Linux [39]. This architecture made use of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) hardware to
store the integrity measurements of the system using the SHA1 hash function module of the
TPM hardware. Unlike AEGIS, this system only takes measurements and does not have a
recovery process. Also, this system can take selective measurements of the software to create
a representative evidence that can be interpreted by the remote party.
The purpose of this architecture is to present an ordered list of measurements to a remote
party. The remote system determines the integrity of the attested system by reconstructing the
image of the attested system’s software stack on the local system using these measurements
and then by applying the security policy on the local software stack. To establish mutual
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trust, this process has to be carried out on both sides involved in the transaction [38]. This
was implemented by instrumenting the Linux kernel to create measurements and to store
them in the TPM hardware to protect against compromised systems. This architecture takes
measurements of the kernel modules, executables and shared libraries, configuration files and
other important files before they are loaded on the system. The advantage of this architecture
is that it could verify integrity of a system up to it’s application layer (web server).
However, the process of mutual attestation is quite complex involving recreating the image
of the other party on the local system based on the measurements obtained and then applying a
security policy to it. The task of taking measurements is implemented by making modifications
to the Linux kernel code. In case of online transactions, common users may not have the Linux
operating system. In a majority of the cases, the two communicating parties may not have
the same operating system in their environments. This makes it difficult to recreate the image
locally based on the measurements sent out by the other party. Our architecture is designed
to address these issues.
Haldar et al. discuss about the broad problems with remote attestation in [18]. According
to them, the most critical shortcoming regarding remote attestation is that it is not based on
program behavior. In our architecture, this problem is solved by having the requirements mon-
itor report the program behavior. Another problem they point out is that remote attestation
is static and inflexible. Though this is true, it does not affect the viability of our architec-
ture because we are not directly measuring the applications which may change frequently, but
all that we monitor is the specific requirements of the applications that are not supposed to
change.
3.4 Distributed Attestation Models
Yoshihama et al. proposed WS-Attestation [47], an attestation architecture on web services
framework. This architecture leverages TCG technologies and allows establishing trust among
distributed parties. WS-Attestation is built on top of existing web services standards. Four
kinds of attestations are proposed - direct attestation, pulled validation, pushed validation
15
and delegated attestation. This model is similar to our architecture, in that, a third party
validates or performs attestation on behalf of the requester. They use an integrity database
as a infrastructure for supporting attestation. This database stores the hash of the packages
installed in the operating system. Further, the authors have tried to map this model to WS-
Trust [4] by implementing the challenge-response protocol through message exchanges. The
goal of this research is to validate the platform on which the web services are running. WS-
Attestation can report errors if the remote platform is affected by viruses or other malware.
The architecture proposed in this thesis work goes beyond validating the remote platforms.
Using the proposed architecture, not only the platforms can be validated, but also the web
services themselves can be monitored for integrity violations and compromises. Our work
mainly concentrates on monitoring the key requirements of web services to detect compromises.
In November 2006, Katsuno et al. proposed a new model of a distributed coalition, called
Trusted Virtual Domain(TVD) [24] for establishing trust among components in a heterogeneous
distributed computing environment. TVD supports distributed mandatory access controls
whose security policies can be different in each domain. A TVD can enforce the security
policies on any components that wish to join that domain. They propose a layered negotiation
approach for negotiating trust. This design makes use of Trusted Computing Base (hardware)
as the lowest layer. Assurances of Trusted Components and TVD agent are achieved by chains
of trust which derive the root of trust from the TCB. Attestation occurs in two stages - local
and global. The global attestation verifys primitives generated by the TCB and the local
attestation verifies component-specific parts depending on the usage-scenarios.
Park et al. present an attack resilient trust model to capture the trustworthiness of the web
service in [32]. Unlike our approach, this approach depends on the cumulative measurements
of trust through multiple requests and responses exchanged among the participants.
Another approach towards achieving trust is aglet [34]. An aglet is a java object with a
code component and a data component. The key idea here is to use these mobile agents to
preserve privacy. An aglet consists of two distinct parts: the aglet core and the aglet proxy.
The aglet core contains all the internal variables and methods. It provides interfaces through
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which the environment can make use of the aglet or vice versa. The core is encapsulated
with an aglet proxy which acts as a shield against any attempt to directly access the private
variables and methods of the aglet. This aglet proxy can be programmed to enforce local
privacy requirements on the site of the remote entity. Aglets are deployed into aglet servers,
which enforces the requirement of the security model. A key problem with aglets is that the
integrity of aglets depends on the integrity of aglet servers, which cannot be guaranteed in an
untrustworthy environment. However, our architecture can be used to ensure the integrity of
the aglet server, which would then provide a basis of integrity for aglets.
3.5 Modeling Non-functional Aspects of SOA
Wada et al. proposed a UML profile to graphically model non-functional aspects in SOA so
that they are incorporated in the development phase [45]. This UML profile includes certain key
model elements of service oriented architecture such as service, message exchange, message,
connector and filter. This model driven development (MDD) paradigm for addressing non-
functional concerns such as security and integrity in the service oriented architecture is an
encouraging step for developing a secure service oriented architecture.
Canfora et al. have presented a detailed analysis of the fundamental issues and solutions
related to various perspectives of testing a service-centric model in [10]. These perspectives
are analyzed considering the needs of the service provider, the system integrator, the third
party certifier and the user. The authors profess that making a service-centric system capable
of self-testing helps overcome issues such as unpredictable response time and availability. This
idea of self-testing was implemented by using the trust analyzer and by extending the concept
to include trust as one of the issues in a service-centric system. The proposed architecture
avoids wastage of resources because it does not force the service provider, the trusted third
party and the user to make any radical changes in the existing architecture. The only initiative
that has to be taken for guaranteeing trust is to use the TPM hardware which is already a
part of the system.
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CHAPTER 4. Problem Definition
In service-oriented architectures, services are often performed on machines that are not
owned or operated by the clients. Composition of services may happen on an entirely different
machine all together. In case of a location-based hotel finding service, the service may expect
clients to provide GPS co-ordinates in a specified format and expect the service implementa-
tion to produce the address of the nearest hotel as a string to those GPS co-ordinates. The
specification of input (GPS co-ordinates) and output (string containing the hotel’s address)
describe the functional requirements for this service. Suppose the service is to be monitored
for the following requirements.
• R1: (Functional Requirement) The response given by the location-based hotel finding
service shall be the closest hotel to the GPS co-ordinates specified by the client
• R2: (Non-functional Requirement)The service shall not persist the GPS co-ordinates
supplied by the client
For R1, it is sufficient to observe or test the interface of the service. On the other hand, to
validate requirements such as R2, it may not be sufficient to validate just the external interface.
The validation for most non-functional requirements may only come from a monitor that
is executing in the same domain as the service implementation and that can validate — by
observing the running service implementation — that the requirements such as R2 are indeed
satisfied. The design and development of these monitors is a widely studied problem in re-
quirements monitoring literature (e.g. see [16, 17, 26, 35]). Nevertheless, the key question
remains; in a (possibly) untrustworthy domain who guarantees the integrity of the monitor? In
other words, who monitors the monitor?
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4.1 Detailed Problem Statement
4.1.1 Goal
The goal of our approach is as follows: given a set of service specification (S), a set of
service implementation (I), a monitor that is capable of detecting deviations in the execution
of the service implementation from its specification (M : S × I → {true, false}) running in
a trusted environment, and a monitor that is similarly capable, but may be running in an
untrustworthy environment (M ′ : S × I → {true, false}), how can we validate that M ≡ M ′
is always true.
4.1.2 Description
To give the reader an idea of the problem with verifying a monitor in an untrustworthy
environment without a root of trust, let us for a moment assume that a validation mechanism
V ′ : M ×M ′ → {true, false} exists. Now in order to answer this validation question, there
must be a part of V ′ running in the same untrustworthy environment that can observe M ′
to compare it with M . If not, V ′ will depend on the untrustworthy environment to observe
M ′, which in turn may mask the true responses of M ′ with expected responses for M thereby
invalidating the premise that V ′ exists. On the other hand, if some part of V ′, say δV ′ is
running in the same untrustworthy environment to observe M ′, we will need another monitor
to verify that the integrity of δV ′ is not compromised, which will need to be verified again, ad
infinitum. In summary, V ′ may not exist.
Using standards such as WS-Security [23] and WS-Trust [4] or proposals such as that by
Skogsurd et al. [41], we can address the issue of security-token interoperability and secure
messaging within SOA. But, these standards are not sufficient to guarantee trust in an un-
trustworthy environment. Existing software solutions mainly concentrate on encrypting files,
messages or other data. Such solutions have an inherent weakness - storage of passwords or
keys. Secure algorithms with large keys are difficult to remember and are hence stored on the
disk. Access to such disks may be password-protected. But, a sophisticated hacker may be
able to crack such a security mechanism. [1]
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We propose to use a hardware-based mechanism as a root of trust for such validation
mechanisms. Along with a hardware-based mechanism, these security standards can be used
to enhance security and guarantee trust in SOA. Let us consider the example described in the
previous paragraph. In this example, if we could be sure that there exists a δV ′ such that we
do not need another monitor to verify its integrity, δV ′ would make V ′ realizable. Fortunately,
recent research results have shown that realization of such hardware-based root of trust is
possible in the form of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [39, 38]. TPM is a co-processor that
is now being shipped with every CPU from major processor vendors and is therefore available
broadly. In this work, we describe an architecture based on TPM to validate the integrity of
a runtime requirement monitor, which will in turn facilitate trusted services.
4.2 Hypothesis
The main goal of this research is to preserve trust among the entities in a service oriented
architecture. The current specification for web services in a service oriented architecture gives
a lot of flexibility and freedom to the service providers and does not prevent them from im-
plementing the services as they like. Currently, there is no fool-proof mechanism to verify
the service provider’s claim. Therefore, an approach is needed to guarantee the integrity of
the web service. We employ the Clark-Wilson model, which was described in Chapter 2, to
monitor the integrity of the requirements monitor which in turn monitors the web service.
Following the Clark-Wilson model, we proposed certain key additions to the standard
SOA in the form of a new interface called trust negotiation and verification interface [21].
The purpose of this interface is to provide an abstraction for the clients to negotiate desired
integrity levels and for brokers to verify the conformance of the service implementation with the
desired specification. The interface also allows broker to communicate with its trusted agent,
the trusted platform module, and with service specific trust monitor in the service providers
domain. The role of the trusted platform module is to periodically validate the integrity of the
trust analyzer that in turn validates the conformance of the service implementation with the
service specification.
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CHAPTER 5. Approach
In the traditional service oriented architecture, there are three main entities: the service
provider, the service broker and the client. The client contacts the service broker with a request
and the broker finds a suitable provider to service the request and then directs the requester to
that service provider. The client then binds to the service provider. Though this model offers
a lot of flexibility for the entities involved, it lacks a layer or an interface that can inspire trust.
Figure 5.1 Proposed Architecture
To provide for the missing trust, we propose certain key additions to the standard SOA
in the form of a new interface called trust negotiation and verification interface as shown in
21
Figure 5.1. The purpose of trust negotiation interface is to facilitate negotiation of the desired
level of trust between the trusted third party and the service provider. Negotiation culminates
in a contract between the two parties. For every transaction, the trusted third party expects
the service provider to provide a proof of execution of this contract. There are many ways of
establishing such contracts. One of the ways is for both the parties to agree on monitoring
certain variables carrying sensitive data. To fulfill such a contract, the service provider has to
send the program traces containing the definition and use of such variables during the execution
of the web service.
After the trust negotiation phase, the trusted third party receives the report from the service
provider as per the contract. Now, the third party has to determine whether the report thus
received is genuine or not. This is because the reports can be either faked or replayed for the
purpose of covering the truth. This verification is carried out by the trust verification interface.
To prevent deception, the third party has a trusted agent on the service provider’s environment
called the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The trust verification interface communicates
with the TPM on the service provider’s environment and obtains a report about the integrity
of its local environment from this TPM. Such a report can include an immutable integrity
measurement of the local architecture along with a time stamp to indicate the freshness of the
measurement.
The key insight that enables us to have a trust verification interface is the fact that the
integrity measurement carried out by the TPM in the local environment of the service provider
cannot be changed, even by the owner of the system. However, such a measurement can be
read by anyone. This measurement can be read by the trust verification interface of the trusted
third party to accurately determine the integrity of the service provider. The cryptographic
capabilities of the TPMs can be leveraged to establish a secure communication channel between
the service provider and the trusted third party. This channel can be used to convey the
integrity measurements to the trusted third party.
The service broker is an ideal candidate for playing the role of the trusted third party. A
requirements monitor that verifies whether the service implementation on the service provider’s
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side conforms to its quality and integrity requirements can be used for servicing the contract
which was established during the trust negotiation phase.
At the end of every transaction, based on the integrity measurements received, the trusted
third party can either send an assurance or a notification of violation to the client. In this way,
the client can trust the web service for its integrity.
Revisiting the hotel-finding service discussed in Chapter 4, suppose the client wants to know
if the service fulfilled the non-functional requirement of not persisting the GPS coordinates
supplied by the client. In this case, the trusted third party would have negotiated such a
contract with the service provider. For this the contract to be enforced, the service provider
has to have a program that monitors the operations carried out on the variables which handle
the GPS coordinates. After every invocation of this web service, the trusted third party receives
a report of integrity of such a program and the platform on which the program is running from
the service provider’s TPM. Based on this measurement, the trusted third party can either
provide an assurance of genuineness to the client or notification of a violation to the client .
5.1 Implementation
The implementation consists of two client-server setups running parallely on the service
provider and on the trusted third party. The process of monitoring is launched by the client
who requests the trusted third party to monitor a web service before invoking it.
In this architecture, we assume that the operating system on the service provider’s envi-
ronment is secure, implying that the service provider will not be able to change to monitoring
software without knowledge of the TPM in the system. For example, the approach proposed
by Sailer et al. to secure the operating system kernel can be used [38]. Section 5.1.1 shows
how the monitoring of a service is initiated by the client. Section 5.1.2 and section 5.1.3 list
out the interactions between the clients and the servers on the service provider and on the
trusted third party. The communication between the components of the proposed architecture
is shown using the interaction diagram in Figure 5.2. The concrete implementation on the
system is depicted in the system diagram in Figure 5.3
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Figure 5.2 Interaction Diagram
The initialization phase is carried out under the supervision of a trusted authority. During
this phase, the authentication server identifies the requirements to be monitored. We emulated
the requirements identification process which consists of determining variables and methods
dealing with data labeled as sensitive, by using Kaveri [22], a tool for program slicing. In
future, we plan to have the requirement specifications as a part of the web service interface
itself, thereby decoupling the process of requirements identification, which is currently tied to
the implementation of the web service.
5.1.1 Client
On the client’s side:
• Notify the trusted third party before the transaction.
• Invoke the web service.
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Figure 5.3 Implementation of the Proposed Architecture
• Wait for an assurance or notification from the trusted third party.
5.1.2 Service Provider
The Trust Analyzer lets the TPM monitor the requirements monitor which in turn monitors
the execution of the web services at runtime. The TPM on the service provider’s system uses
AIK (Attestation Identity Key) to encrypt data in order to to make the interactions secure.
AIK is a special purpose asymmetric signature key created by the TPM manufacturer, the
private portion of which is non-migratable and protected by the TPM. Since the private part
of the TPM’s AIK cannot be retrieved by any user, the decryption of the data has to be done
only on the trusted third party’s machine using the private part of it’s AIK.
Initialization phase on service provider’s side:
• Accept the requirements to be monitored.
For every transaction, the following actions are carried out by the trust analyzer:
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• Get a nonce from the authentication server of the trusted third party.
• Generate a trace for the specific web service implementation program using the require-
ments monitor.
• Using the local TPM, compute the SHA1 hash of the software stack up to the requirements
monitor including the nonce.
• Encrypt the hash using the public part of AIK of the TPM of the trusted third party.
• Send the execution trace, nonce and the execution trace to the trusted third party.
5.1.3 Trusted Third Party
The trusted third party hosts an authentication server. For every transaction, the authen-
tication server generates a unique nonce to guard against replay attacks. A nonce is a random
number that is generated only once and is included in all interactions of a particular session to
prove the freshness of data. It is to be noted that the trace is not being verified for an exact
equivalence. This will lead to false positives because a program can be modified for purposes
such as bug-fixing, without violating the specifications. Therefore, we programmatically check
for violation of specific properties listed before. If any of the system, configuration or library
files up to the requirements monitor are even slightly tampered, there will be significant vari-
ations in the final SHA1 hash value. It takes about 269 units of time to find SHA1 collisions
according [46], implying that collisions are very rare. Hence, these variations can be detected
easily.
Initialization phase on the trusted third party:
• Identify the requirements to be monitored.
• Install the requirements monitor and on the program and generate a trace for the re-
quirements determined above.
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• Using TPM, measure the software stack up to the requirements monitor and store this
measurement for future reference.
For every transaction, the following are done by the authentication server:
• On receiving a request from the client for monitoring, send a nonce to the service provider.
• Receive the execution trace, nonce and the encrypted measurement of the software stack
from the service provider for a specific execution of the web service.
• Decrypt the data in the TPM using the private part of it’s non-migratable AIK to get
the TPM measurement of the service provider’s software stack upto the requirements
monitor and verify the value for conformance.
• Check the nonce for freshness to guard against replay attacks.
• With the reference measurement as the basis, programmatically check the trace for vio-
lation of specific properties.
• If any of these tests fail, notify the user of a possibility of violation.
• If all the verifications were successful, send an assurance to the client.
For every transaction involving sensitive data, the client initiates the monitoring procedures
on the service provider’s system as well as on the trusted third party. As the transaction
proceeds, the requirements monitor monitors the integrity of the service implementations. At
the end of the transaction, the client gets either an assurance or a violation alert from the
trusted third party.
The next chapter summarizes the results of evaluating this architecture on the subject web
services. It is demonstrated that integrity verification of web services can be achieved with a
very short time-overhead if Aspect monitors are used.
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CHAPTER 6. Evaluation
The goal of this chapter is to validate the following two claims:
1. Feasibility: The proposed extension of SOA can be implemented in a realistic setting.
2. Effectiveness: The proposed architecture is useful for monitoring non-functional re-
quirements of web services.
To validate the first claim of feasibility, the details of a working implementation of the
proposed architectural extension was provided in the Chapter 5. To support the second claim,
popular web services were selected and monitored for integrity. The subjects for our case
study were selected from the web service implementations available from the Apache Axis
distribution. Table 6.1 briefly describes the web services used for this case study and the
sections of the service implementation that was traced by the requirement monitor for each
web service. Some of these sections were chosen randomly while others were chosen to monitor
certain methods handling specific data, labeled as sensitive. The Section 6.3 presents a detailed
analysis of the overheads incurred in monitoring the web services for their corresponding non-
functional properties. It is also shown that the time lag caused by monitoring is negligible and
thus, the proposed architecture effectively monitors the integrity of the web services.
6.1 Experimental Setup
The experimental setup was implemented using two Dell Precision 390 stations each having
Intel Core2 Duo Processor @ 1.86 GHz and 2 GB of RAM. The processors on these stations
have a TPM (Version 1.2) manufactured by Atmel Corporation, embedded in them with 24
PCRs each. One of the stations is assigned the role of a service provider while the other plays
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Table 6.1 Subjects for our Case Study
Service
name
Short description Traced Sections of the Service
Implementation
Stock Gets quote for the stock ”symbol” 1. Instructions invoking setters.
2. Methods with private access.
Echo Echoes a string 1. Method entries and exits.
2. Methods with public access.
Encoding Serialization of a message 1. Methods with private access.
2. Instructions which invoke getters.
Message Simple XML messaging service 1. Methods with private access.
2. Instructions invoking getters.
Bidbuy Request for a quote, purchase a given
quantity of a specified product and
process purchase order.
1. Method entries and exits.
2. Instructions that invoke getters and
setters.
the role of a trusted third party. We used tpm4java for developing our trust analyzer to take
integrity measurements of the requirements monitor on the service provider’s side. The Java
library tpm4java, developed by Tews et al. [43], is used for accessing the TPM functionality
from Java applications. The test environment consists of Apache Web server Version 2.2, Tom-
cat Servlet Container Version 5.5.23 and Axis SOAP server Version 1.2 running on Windows
XP Professional operating system. For evaluating the requirements of the web service imple-
mentation, we use a commercial software called CodeMonitorTM (monitor) from Tangentum
Technologies [14] as our subject monitor. The monitor instruments the Java bytecode to log
certain actions and this makes it possible to monitor web services that have already been
deployed. For doing these, it must be installed in the same environment as that of the web
service. For the purpose of this experiment, we defined the requirement as, ” The execution
trace of the program involving the variables and methods dealing with client data labeled as
sensitive, should not include APIs dealing with persistence or serialization.”
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6.2 Violations
This class of compromise involving only the violation of requirements can be detected by
current approaches for requirements monitoring (e.g. [26, 35]). Using similar techniques,
our subject monitor was also able to give the execution trace for methods that caused either
persistence or serialization of data. When such a violation occurs, the trusted third party can
signal the end user of a breach of trust by the web service.
However, current approaches do not detect violation when the requirement monitor is itself
compromised. Since the monitor has to be installed in the service provider’s environment, the
monitor can be compromised in many ways. For this paper, we instrumented the monitor to
report a normal trace even when there was a violation of trust. Thus, the integrity of the web
service is a function of the integrity of the requirements monitoring software. One such case
is presented in Figure 7, in which one of the library files of the monitor is altered. Since the
monitor itself is being monitored by the hardware-based TPM, it is possible to detect such a
violation.
Table 6.2 TPM Measurements for a Genuine and a Compromised Require-
ments Monitor
Files Monitored by
TPM
160-bit SHA1 Hash of
Genuine Monitor
160-bit SHA1 of the
Compromised Monitor
../codemonitor.license 6476...DB8F 6476...DB8F
...
../codemonitor.config 8D9E...5FA8 8D9E...5FA8
../codemonitor.jar 23F9...5BA2 D843...1531
../jbcs-client.jar 86AA...BE56 0F66...00F7
...
From Table 6.2, it can be observed that the hash values in the third column starting from
the entry corresponding to the file codemonitor.jar differ significantly from their corresponding
entries in the second column. This is because the SHA1 hashing algorithm in the TPM not
only hashes the listed files but also preserves the order of hashing. It implies that at least one
of the library files including codemonitor.jar has been altered without the knowledge of the
trusted third party.
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6.3 Overhead of Monitoring
Table 6.3 compares the average time taken to execute a web service in a standalone manner,
when CodeMonitor is used and when custom Aspects are applied for monitoring the web service
implementation for the properties listed in Table 6.1. These values are the averages of the
time taken to execute the service over ten client requests. The overhead due to CodeMonitor
is greater because, it instruments all the instructions used in the web service implementation
including those of the libraries, at run time. Since the source code for CodeMonitor was not
available, we could not circumvent this overhead. So, we wrote custom aspects to monitor the
same sections of the service implementation and achieved a better performance. This validates
the claim that web services can be monitored for integrity without a tangible time lag in
responding to the client’s request.
Table 6.3 Overhead of Monitoring
Service Execution Time
without any moni-
tor (in seconds)
Execution time
with CodeMonitor
(in seconds)
Execution time
with Aspect Moni-
tor
Stock 0.944 10.688 1.283
11.476 1.005
Echo 1.299 42.375 1.609
12.812 1.640
Encoding 0.738 11.828 0.922
9.621 1.026
Message 0.945 7.200 1.209
20.641 1.208
Bidbuy 0.993 83.110 1.349
10.900 1.341
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CHAPTER 7. Case Study
In order to explain the method adopted to evaluate every web service, we will use an
example web service (Shopping cart) shown in Figure 7.1. This figure depicts a common case
of violation of trust by a web service involved in financial transactions. This service was used
in addition to the case study subjects from Apache Axis project.
7.1 Example Web Service - Shopping Cart
The shopping cart web service consumes the credit card number, the card validation code
(cvc) and the purchase order, as the input from the customer. At the end of the transaction,
the customer gets back the invoice number, which is the output of the web service. In this
example, the customer is unaware of the fact that the web service provider has processed the
customer’s input for adversarial purposes and that it has stored his credit card number within
its local database.
The web service implementation could have been certified to be compliant at the time
of deployment, but later, it might have been reprogrammed by the service provider with a
malicious intent. This violation of trust goes undetected. In essence, without much ado, the
web service provider has extracted the customer’s credit card number and other important
data. Currently, there are no established strategies for detecting unsafe persistence of data or
for detecting adversarial computation in a service provider’s environment.
7.2 Experiment
We created shopping cart web-service described in the previous section. The web service
is invoked from a web browser of another machine. The web service accepts the credit card
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Figure 7.1 Example of Trust Violation
details and a list of items in the shopping cart as the input for the transaction and outputs
the invoice, carrying out all the intermediate tasks from fulfilling the order to billing the client
appropriately. We used the monitor to observe the definition and use of data fields carrying
sensitive data. The trace produced by the monitor is shown in Figure 7.2. The monitor
produces trace preceded by PUT and GET corresponding to the data fields carrying sensitive
data.
ENTRY Connect.initialize()
PUT Connect.name="John Doe"
...
GET Connect.name "John Doe"
...
Order successfully processed: John Doe
Figure 7.2 Output trace for the original service
Since the monitor is also in the service provider’s environment it can be compromised to
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not to report the violations. We mimicked the compromise by instrumenting the monitor to
ignore any violations that might have occurred. Such a requirements monitor can be used by
a service provider to report wellness when all is not well with the web service. This is when
a hardware-based trust mechanism can falsify a wrong claim of the service provider. We used
the trusted platform module to validate the monitor to ensure that it is not compromised or
changed. Next subsections report on the following two cases of requirements violation:
1. The monitor detects a violation in the web service.
2. The monitor itself is compromised and hence the violations are not reported. However,
such a compromise is detected by the hardware-based trust mechanism.
7.2.1 Monitor detects trust violation
This class of compromise can be detected by current approaches for requirements monitor-
ing (e.g. [16, 17, 26, 35]). Using similar techniques, our prototype requirements monitor was
also able to detect the compromise.
ENTRY com.mysql.jdbc.Statement.executeQuery
("SHOW VARIABLES")
ENTRY com.mysql.jdbc.Connection.prepare
Statement
("INSERT INTO cnumbers(name,ccn,cvc) VALUES
(?,?,?)")
...
Figure 7.3 Trace for compromised web service
Figure 7.2 shows the trace generated for the clean-room web service and the Figure 7.3
shows the execution trace of the compromised web service. Here, storing the credit card
number in the database is considered a violation of integrity by the web service. Since the
authentication server on the trusted third party stores the execution trace of the clean-room
implementation, it can detect any violations by comparing the latest trace with that of the
original one. When such a violation occurs, the trusted third party can signal the end user of
a breach of trust by the web service.
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7.2.2 Detecting a compromised monitor
Since the monitor has to be installed in the service provider’s environment, the monitor
itself can be compromised without much difficulty in a realistic setting. For this paper, we
have instrumented the monitor to compromise its nature. There are many other ways of
compromising the monitor itself. If the monitor can be decompiled, the source code can be
changed to suit one’s interests. Another way can be to instrument the monitor to ignore the
violations. When this is done, the requirements monitor reports the trace as shown in figure 7.2
even when there is a violation of trust. Thus, the integrity of the web service is a function of
the integrity of the requirements monitoring software. One such case is presented in Table 7.1
in which one of the library files of the monitor is altered. Since the monitor itself is being
monitored by the hardware-based TPM, it is possible to detect such a violation. A service
provider can also replay the same trace after every transaction. To prevent such occurrences,
the trust analyzer on the service provider’s side requests the trusted third party for a nonce
which will be used by the service provider’s TPM to compute the hash of the requirements
monitor.The requirements monitor should also include this nonce in every trace it generates
to prove that the measurements are fresh.
Table 7.1 Case Study: Comparison of TPM Measurements between a gen-
uine and a compromised Monitor
File 160-bit SHA1 Hash of
Genuine Monitor
160-bit SHA1 of the
Modified Monitor
../readme.txt 5887...2111 5887...2111
../codemonitor.license 6476...DB8F 6476...DB8F
../Connect.class 9F2B...A638 9F2B...A638
../Connect.java 1394...BC86 1394...BC86
../codemonitor.config 8D9E...5FA8 8D9E...5FA8
../codemonitor.jar 23F9...5BA2 D843...1531
../jbcs-client.jar 86AA...BE56 0F66...00F7
../jdax.jar 85F7...30E2 2020...8D15
../xjbc-jdax.jar 944E...1F3E 99CA...547F
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The first column of the Table 7.1 lists the files of monitor being monitored by the TPM. The
second column shows the 160-bit hash values of PCR #10 during the clean-room measurement
of the software. The third column shows those measurements that were obtained after the
class files of one of the library files were altered. It can be observed that the hash values
in the third column starting from the entry corresponding to the file codemonitor.jar differ
significantly from their corresponding entries in the second column. This is because the SHA1
hashing algorithm in the TPM not only hashes the contents of the candidate files but also
preserves the order in which the files were hashed. This implies that at least one of the library
files including codemonitor.jar has been altered without the knowledge of the trusted third
party. The list of files that were monitored, which includes property files, system files and
executables, is long and only a subset of this list is published in this paper to demonstrate the
viability of the concept.
This case study demonstrated that the proposed architecture can not only detect the in-
tegrity violation by the web service but also detect the tampering of the requirements monitor
software and can produce evidence for both events.
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CHAPTER 8. Conclusions
The goal of this thesis was to evaluate the web services for non-functional requirements or
concerns such as privacy and integrity. The traditional service oriented architecture lacks a
layer or an interface that is capable of inspiring trust in the clients. To evaluate a web service
implementation for integrity, there has to be a monitoring software to oversee the execution of a
web service implementation and report accurate data regarding this execution. Such a monitor
has to be deployed in the remote environment. To trust the results sent by the monitor, there
must be a mechanism of validating monitors deployed in the remote environments. However,
we showed that it is very difficult to trust a monitor deployed in a remote or untrustworthy
environment using any of the software-based approaches.
We proposed an extension to the traditional service oriented architecture to incorporate a
layer of trust negotiation and verification other than the usual service negotiation. The trust
negotiation interface helps to establish a contract of trust between the service provider and
a trusted third party. This contract is verified by the trust verification interface by securely
communicating with the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) on the service provider’s environ-
ment. The root of trust in our architecture is derived from the hardware (TPM) rather than
software. Thus, the proposed architecture makes it possible to give an assurance to the client
with a high level of confidence.
The implementation of the proposed architecture was evaluated using the standard web
services available with the Apache Axis Distribution. The evaluation demonstrated the fea-
sibility of implementing the proposed extensions to the SOA in a realistic setting. It also
demonstrated that the proposed architecture was effective in monitoring the non-functional
requirements of the web services.
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8.1 Discussion
Existing security models for web-services mostly consider four security and trust issues in
the service infrastructures. The first question is whether the requesting entity, i.e. client, is who
they claim to be. The second question is whether the client is authorized to use the service.
The third question is whether the data, i.e. service request and reply messages, exchanged
between the client and the service provider is protected from unauthorized access and from
tampering. The fourth question is whether the client and/or the provider are protected from
the each other’s denial of service attacks.
These questions, while important, do not address a key concern of clients. Provided a rea-
sonable security framework is available, the client gets the guarantee that the service request
and replies will be protected from unauthorized access and tampering; however, these frame-
works do not offer any guarantee whether the data will remain private and tamper-proof in the
application domain of the service provider. Note that the application domain of the service
provider is where the client’s service requests are processed and replies returned. A service
oriented architecture is only as secure as its weakest link. In a truly decoupled environment,
which is the main motto of SOAs, including constructs to negotiate, enforce, and verify trust
and security guarantees within the provider’s application domain through the service discovery
interfaces thus seems to be a crucial pre-condition of mission-critical deployment of SOAs.
My work thus creates a timely opportunity to rethink the traditional notion of trust in
service oriented architecture.
8.2 Future Work
Contracts are important for web services. A framework that lets the client specify certain
properties that are to be enforced on the web service implementation will make this architecture
complete. Behavioral interface specification languages like Java Modeling Language [11] are
widely used to specify behavior of Java modules. It is a powerful Design by Contract (DBC)
tool for Java. Can a specification language similar to JML be designed to enforce contracts
such as data privacy and integrity on the remote web service implementations?
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It would be very helpful if there are customized virtual machines available that are capable
of enforcing integrity requirements on the executable code. This leads us to another interesting
direction. Can certain modules which can enforce specific trust properties at the byte code
level of web service implementations be incorporated in a Virtual Machine?
There is a potential overhead in the monitoring process. The entire source code is monitored
for deviations. For small implementations, there is hardly any overhead. However, as the size of
the implementation increases, there would be a tangible time delay caused by such verification
mechanism. Can we use program analysis techniques such as data-flow graphs or control-flow
graphs to restrict the scope of monitoring to segments of code that deal with sensitive data?
One of the primary goals of security architectures is to prevent data leaks from a more
secure/sensitive level to the lower levels. Information flow mechanisms involve building archi-
tectures to prevent such insecure data flows. Is it possible to build an architecture to ensure
secure information flow in the web service deployed on this architecture?
This research work explored the aspect of finding mechanisms for enforcing non-functional
requirements and security properties in web services. The above mentioned areas can be ex-
plored further in the context of Service Oriented Architecture along the lines of this research
work. Any breakthrough in that direction will contribute towards building an efficient, trust-
worthy and secure Service Oriented Architecture.
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